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I. INTRODUCTION
As interest rates rise, adjustable-rate mortgage payments swell, and
consumer debt grows, many Washington homeowners find themselves
being pushed toward the brink of foreclosure.1 At the same time, how-
ever, the booming housing market of recent years has led to home price
appreciation that has greatly outpaced inflation.2 Financially distressed
homeowners may not realize that the spike in home values has created
substantial home equity in their properties.3 This confluence of financial
distress and rising home values has created a nationwide epidemic of a
type of mortgage fraud known as the foreclosure rescue scam (FRS). 4 A
typical FRS involves the conveyance of a homeowner's property to a
"rescuer" who promises to save the home from foreclosure, coupled with
a lease-option agreement that makes the homeowner a tenant in the home
he or she previously owned. This purported transactional "rescue" is
soon followed by the former homeowner's eviction by the "rescuer."
The former homeowner is left homeless; the "rescuer" walks away with
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the property's equity.5  "Rescuers," or foreclosure rescue scam artists
(FRSAs),6 target stressed homeowners who are on the brink of losing
their homes.7 Moreover, they focus on those who can least afford to be
scammed: elderly and low-income homeowners.8
FRSAs easily identify distressed homeowners by monitoring re-
corded notices of default on government websites 9 or by subscribing to a
private service that compiles lists of such notices.10 Homeowners in de-
fault soon find themselves inundated by offers of help from FRSAs,"
who try to create a personal connection with homeowners through phone
calls and personal visits. 12 They promise a chance to start over but warn
the homeowner that he or she must act quickly to save his or her home
and must not contact a lawyer or the mortgage lender.' 3 FRSAs promise
to pay off the amount owed by the homeowner in return for the convey-
ance of the property; they then structure a lease-buyback arrangement
that sets the scam victim up to fail.' 4 At some point, the former owner
inevitably misses an unaffordable rent payment and is unceremoniously
evicted from the home he or she once owned. 15 Thus, the scam is com-
plete: The FRSA keeps the home and its equity. 16 Part II of this Com-
ment will further explore the intricacies of how this scam is accom-
plished.
While FRS victims have many remedies under existing statutes,
these remedies are inadequate because they fail to holistically address the
FRS problem. A successful statutory approach to combating the spread
of this insidious scam must rest on three legs: education, enforcement,
and litigation. First, homeowners facing foreclosure need timely warn-
ings regarding the existence and prevalence of the FRS before the on-
slaught of FRSA solicitations begins. Next, in addition to education,
5. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 8.
6. FRSAs may also be referred to as "foreclosure consultants" or "foreclosure rescue special-
ists."
7. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 5.
8. Nathaniel C. Nichols, Home Alone: Home Mortgage Foreclosure Rescue Scams and the
Theft of Equity, 11 J. AFFORDABLE HoUs. & CMTY. DEV. L. 280, 280-81 (2002).
9. See, e.g., King County Recorder's Office Official Public Records,
http://www.metrokc.gov/recelec/records/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2007).
10. See, e.g., foreclosure.com, http://www.foreclosure.com/ (last visited Oct. 18, 2006).
11. Le, supra note 1, at Al.
12. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 9.
13. Id.
14. Le, supra note 1. In a lease-buyback arrangement, the homeowner surrenders title to the
house but continues living there as a tenant, with the right to repurchase the property within the next
few years. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 8.
15. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 9.
16. Id.
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homeowners need effective enforcement of the statutes that are supposed
to protect them. Finally, homeowners wronged by FRSAs need to be
able to seek civil relief that both adequately compensates them for their
losses and provides incentives to attorneys willing to represent them in
these complex, time-consuming cases.
By making only minor amendments to existing statutes, the Wash-
ington legislature could accomplish all three goals, thereby significantly
strengthening protections for financially distressed homeowners. There-
fore, focusing on the State of Washington, 17 this Comment recommends
amendments to the Equity Skimming Act (ESA), 18 Deeds of Trust Act, 19
Mortgage Lending Fraud Prosecution Account Act, 2° and the Consumer
Protection Act (CPA).2'
To fully illustrate the problem, Part II will examine the structure of
a typical FRS and provide a case study of an actual FRS that took place
in King County. Part III will then survey the range of statutory, common
law, and equitable remedies available to FRS victims in Washington.
Finally, Part IV recommends four state statutory amendments that will
eliminate loopholes, strengthen enforcement, and educate potential vic-
tims.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Structure of a Foreclosure Rescue Scam
Homeowners become potential FRS victims when they default on
their mortgage payments, leading to foreclosure under the Deeds of Trust
Act.22 This Act requires that a notice of the forthcoming foreclosure sale
be sent to the homeowner. 23 Currently, only a notice of the foreclosure
sale is required by the statute, even though this early contact with dis-
tressed homeowners offers a valuable opportunity to educate them about
the existence and danger of FRSAs.24
Upon learning of the pending foreclosure sale, the FRSAs begin to
circle. Their aim is to obtain a substantial portion of a defaulting
17. Statutes regulating "foreclosure consultants" have been enacted in California, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota, and Missouri. An analysis of such legislation lies outside of
the scope of this Comment.
18. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34 (2006).
19.Id. § 61.24.
20.Id. § 36.22.18.
2 1.Id. § 19.86.
22. Id. § 61.24.
23. See id. § 61.24.040(1)(b)(i).
24. See infra Part IV.B.
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homeowner's equity without providing a material benefit in return. 25 To
accomplish this, an FRSA first convinces the homeowner that he or she
will prevent the foreclosure for a reasonable fee. 26 After obtaining the
homeowner's trust by paying repeated visits and establishing a personal
relationship, the FRSA purchases the house from the homeowner for a
very low price, pays off the homeowner's mortgage debt, leases the
home back to the homeowner for a year or two at an unaffordable rate,
and gives the homeowner a repurchase option that he or she will be un-
able to exercise. To complete the scam and abscond with the home-
owner's equity, the FRSA simply sells the property for its fair market
value after evicting the homeowner either for nonpayment of rent or be-
cause the lease has expired.28
Often, the FRS is complicated by the presence of a third-party "in-
vestor," who is commonly an accomplice of the FRSA.29 In this version
of the scam, FRSAs act as middlemen between the homeowner and the
investor.3 ° In return for their "services," FRSAs may collect fees from
the homeowner for handling the transaction, split the homeowner's eq-
uity with the investor after the property has been resold, or both.31
An FRS necessarily involves a substantial amount of deceit, trick-
ery, and exploitation, 32 making the elderly and those with cognitive dis-
abilities especially susceptible.33 FRSAs commonly use the following
tactics to defraud their victims: (1) making promises to the homeowner
but subsequently omitting them in the final documents; (2) having the
homeowner sign incomplete documents and subsequently filling in the
terms; (3) delaying the signing until the last moment before the foreclo-
sure sale, thereby depriving the homeowner of better options and forcing
him or her to sign whatever documents the FRSA presents; (4) charging
excessive fees; and/or (5) failing to disclose material information about
the proposed transactions.3 4 In addition, some FRSAs employ a method
known as "affinity marketing," in which they attempt to gain the victim's
trust by demonstrating commonalities with the victim and persuading
25. Steve Fredrickson & Eric Dunn, King County Bar Association Foreclosure Rescue Scams
Continuing Legal Education Materials 2 (July 14, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
author).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id.
31. See id.
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him or her that they are on the same side.35 A Spanish-speaking FRSA,
for example, might exclusively target Spanish-speaking homeowners.36
The case study presented next provides an excellent example of a
FRSA gaining the trust of the victim by demonstrating a commonality of
personal issues.
B. Case Study
Amy Jones was a single woman in her fifties, living solely on dis-
ability income and acting as the sole caregiver for her adult son, who was
severely mentally ill.37 In the spring of 2001, Amy was unemployed and
fell behind in the mortgage payments for the home she shared with her
son. In March, a notice of trustee's sale was issued, stating that the
house would be sold at public auction in June unless $6,290, the amount
in arrears, was paid by June 18.
The June deadline passed. Shortly before the home was to be auc-
tioned off, Rick Coburn, a broker at a well-known real estate company,
appeared unsolicited at Amy's doorstep. Coburn told her that he knew
her property was going to be auctioned. He gave her his business card
and told her that he and his friend, the president of a mortgage company,
were experienced in foreclosure matters and could help save her home.
Coburn emphasized that he had helped many people in her situation.
Amy declined his help, stating that she planned on delaying the sale by
filing for bankruptcy the next day. Coburn departed, but not before omi-
nously warning her that bankruptcy would not save her house or the eq-
uity she had accumulated.38
The very next day, Coburn's accomplice came to Amy's house. He
introduced himself as Jim Rogers, the president of Cobum's mortgage
company, and gave her his business card, which contained the slogan,
"Providing Financial Solutions for a Brighter Tomorrow." Rogers reiter-
ated that he could help save Amy's home, and he asked if he could come
inside to discuss the matter. She declined, stating that she had just filed
for bankruptcy that morning. Not one to be rebuffed, Rogers remained
on the porch and began confiding to her about his personal life.
35. TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 10.
36. Id.
37. Although names have been changed to protect the privacy of those involved, this case study
is based on facts alleged in a complaint recently filed in King County Superior Court.
38. A bankruptcy petition would probably have only delayed Amy's loss of her house for a few
months, as her income was insufficient to allow her to reorganize her debts, preserve her important
assets, such as the house, and remain solvent. A sale of the home at fair market value, however,
would likely have enabled her to both pay off her debt and retain her accumulated equity. See
Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 3.
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
Specifically, he discussed his difficult childhood and alcoholic father.
Amy, in turn, opened up and told Rogers about her son's mental illness
and her own struggles with depression.
Amy's bankruptcy petition caused the foreclosure sale to be post-
poned for four months, until October. In the months leading up to the
sale, Coburn and Rogers visited or called her at least twenty times, plead-
ing with her to let them help save her house. Coburn and Rogers never
specifically explained how they would accomplish this. Amy assumed,
however, that because Rogers ran a mortgage company, the assistance
would involve refinancing her existing mortgage. Believing that Coburn
and Rogers were truly interested in helping her, Amy divulged additional
personal information to them during this period. Specifically, she con-
fided that she continued to be severely depressed and that she could not
afford to pay a lawyer to complete her bankruptcy action.
In October, Amy realized that time was running out. Her bank-
ruptcy petition would soon be dismissed, and she would lose her home.
Believing there was no alternative, she finally agreed to accept Coburn
and Rogers's help. She filled out a loan application and sent it to Rogers.
Shortly before the foreclosure sale, Coburn summoned her to his real
estate company and asked her to sign four documents. Coburn was care-
ful to keep Amy engaged in conversation as she signed the documents
without reading them. Although she was not given copies of what she
had signed, it later became apparent that she had executed: (1) a pur-
chase-and-sale agreement describing a sale of her home to Coburn and
Rogers for $160,000; (2) a statutory warranty deed conveying her home
to Coburn and Rogers; (3) an option to repurchase the property within
two years at seventy-five percent of its assessed value; and (4) a one-year
lease stating that she would rent the property back from Coburn and
Rogers at $1,400 per month.
After the mortgage loan, property taxes, and closing costs were paid
off by Coburn and Rogers, Amy was left with $7,350. The amount of
the loan at the time it was repaid was $148,250, and the home's value
was assessed that year at $310,000, which meant that her equity was con-
servatively valued at $161,750. She had conveyed her equity to Coburn
and Rogers for less than five cents on the dollar. Moreover, to repur-
chase her property before the option expired in two years, Amy would
need to pay the duo approximately $242,250 (seventy-five percent of the
2003 assessed value), in addition to the monthly rent payments. In the
unlikely event Amy was to somehow accomplish this feat, Coburn and
Rogers would receive a $79,250 return on their $163,450 investment. A
more likely outcome, of course, would be the expiration of the repur-
chase option and Amy's subsequent eviction, after which Coburn and
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Rogers would sell the house for its full market value and pocket an even
greater return.
Amy continued to live in her former home for the next two and a
half years, until 2004. Although her monthly rent payment was initially
$1,400 per month, Coburn and Rogers later raised it to $1,550 per month.
As they were well aware, Amy had originally defaulted on her mortgage
because she was unable to make regular payments of $1,480 per month
on that loan. Knowing that they could not complete the scam while Amy
was in the house, Coburn and Rogers, her purported rescuers, had set her
up to fail.
But she didn't fail-somehow Amy managed to keep current with
the payments. Coburn and Rogers, however, had a backup plan. In the
summer of 2004, after the repurchase option had lapsed, they notified
Amy that they would not renew her lease. In September, they evicted
her, and she and her mentally ill son joined the ranks of the homeless.
She was forced to move back in with her father, while her son resorted to
sleeping in her car. In October, distraught over her situation, Amy at-
tempted suicide by overdosing on sleeping pills.
Next, Part III of this Comment will examine existing remedies that
Amy might pursue in attempting to regain her home and/or equity.
III. EXISTING REMEDIES IN WASHINGTON
A. State Remedies
The following sections of this Comment survey the various state
bases of recovery for FRS victims. Many of the theories applicable in
FRS litigation arise under state law.39  First, statutory remedies under
acts such as the CPA are examined. Second, remedies under common
law theories such as fraud are discussed. Finally, equitable remedies
such as the theories of equitable mortgage and unconscionability are con-
sidered. This Comment contends that the Washington legislature can
39. See Equity Skimming Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34 (2006); Mortgage Broker Practices
Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146 (2007); Credit Services Organization Act, WASH. REV. CODE §
19.134 (2006); Consumer Protection Act, WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86 (2006). The remedies dis-
cussed throughout Part III might also apply vicariously to a company employing an FRSA in certain
circumstances. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 25-27. Vicarious liability aids FRS victims
in obtaining relief because, while an individual FRSA may be judgment-proof, the employer com-
pany presumably will have deeper pockets. Establishing vicarious liability can be difficult for an
FRS victim, however, because he or she must convince a fact-finder that the company has either
given the FRSA actual authority to act on its behalf or manifested to a third party, based on a reason-
able and objective interpretation, that the FRSA has apparent authority to act on its behalf. See
Udall v. T.D. Escrow Svcs., Inc., 132 Wash. App. 290, 300, 130 P.3d 908, 913 (2006).
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best protect vulnerable homeowners from FRSAs by taking action that
recognizes and strengthens the three legs (education, enforcement, and
litigation) of a holistic approach to preventing equity theft. Specifically,
as recommended in Part IV, the legislature can best effectuate such pro-
tection by making minor amendments to the ESA, 40 Deeds of Trust
Act, 41 Mortgage Lending Fraud Prosecution Account Act, 42 and the
CPA.43
1. Statutory Remedies
a. Consumer Protection Act
The CPA, which prohibits unfair, deceptive, or fraudulent business
practices, 44 can provide an FRS victim relief either standing alone or in
conjunction with other statutes, but it offers an inadequate remedy be-
cause of a low damages cap. It assumes great significance in FRS litiga-
tion because it can provide the remedy for violations of other consumer
protection statutes commonly violated by FRSAs.45 The CPA fails to
protect victimized homeowners, however, because its $10,000 cap on
exemplary damages has not been raised since being established in
197 1.46 This paltry limit reduces the number of attorneys willing to rep-
resent FRS victims, discourages the victims themselves from vindicating
their rights, decreases governmental efficiency, and fails to deter both
actual and potential FRSAs.47
A plaintiff bringing a claim under the CPA must establish five ele-
ments: (1) the defendant committed an unfair or deceptive act or prac-
tice; (2) the act or practice occurred in trade or commerce; (3) the act or
practice impacts the public interest; (4) the plaintiff suffered injury; and
48(5) the act or practice caused the injury.
40. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34 (2006).
41. Id. § 61.24.
42.Id. § 36.22.181.
43. Id. § 19.86.
44. Id. § 19.86.920.
45. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 28-29; infra Parts III.A. 1 .b-d, III.B. 1-2.
46. 25 DAVID K. DEWOLF ET AL., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CONTRACT LAW AND PRACTICE §
18-310.00 (2006).
47. See infra Part IV.D.
48. Westview Invs., Ltd. v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 133 Wash. App. 835, 854, 138 P.3d 638,
647 (2006). FRS victims pursuing a CPA claim may establish one or more of these elements by
showing that the FRSA violated other statutes. For example, a violation of the Credit Services Or-
ganization Act establishes the first CPA element, see WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.070(5) (2006);
infra Part llI.A.ld, while a violation of the Mortgage Brokers Practices Act establishes the first
three CPA elements, see WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.100 (2006); infra Part llI.A.I.c.
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Unless established through the violation of another statute,49
whether the first three elements are met are questions of fact.50 If neces-
sary, an FRS victim could meet the first CPA element by arguing, for
example, that the FRSA committed unfair and deceptive acts either by
delaying the closing date until immediately before the foreclosure sale or
by arranging less favorable terms in a written transaction than were de-
scribed orally.51 To meet the second element, the homeowner could ar-
gue that the FRSA's conduct occurred in trade or commerce because the
FRSA sought a fee for providing a commercial service.52 To meet the
third element, an FRS victim might argue that an FRSA's unfair or de-
ceptive conduct implicates the public interest for four reasons: (1) the
conduct usually takes place in the course of the FRSA's business; (2)
most FRSAs advertise to the general public; (3) FRSAs generally ac-
tively solicit their victims; and (4) FRSAs typically occupy a superior
bargaining position to the homeowner.53
Even if the first three elements are established, in order to prevail
on his or her CPA claim, an FRS victim must establish the fourth and
fifth elements without the assistance of the auxiliary statutes.54 To meet
the fourth element, the homeowner must establish that he or she was in-
jured through the loss of his or her home and/or equity.55 Finally, to
meet the fifth element, the homeowner must prove that, but for the
FRSA's unfair or deceptive conduct, the homeowner would have re-
tained the home or equity he or she lost.
56
If an FRS victim can meet all five elements, the CPA is a valuable
weapon because it allows injunctive relief, the awarding of attorney's
fees and court costs, and a discretionary award of exemplary damages,
not to exceed $10,000, of up to three times the amount of actual dam-
ages.57 As previously mentioned, the $10,000 cap has not been raised
since it was first instituted in 1971.58 Adjusted for inflation, $10,000 in
1971 is equivalent to roughly $50,000 today.
59
49. See infra Parts lII.A.l.b-d, III.B.I-2.
50. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 29.
51. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.020 (2006).
52. See id. § 19.86.010(2).
53. See Svendsen v. Stock, 143 Wash. 2d 546, 559, 23 P.3d 455, 461 (2001).
54. See infra Parts III.A.l.b-d, III.B.1-2.
55. See Hangman Ridge Training Stables v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 105 Wash. 2d 778, 792, 719
P.2d 531, 539 (1986).
56. See id. at 792-93, 719 P.2d at 539.
57. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.090 (2006).
58. DEWOLF ET AL., supra note 46.
59. The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/infl.cgi (last visited Nov. 25,
2006).
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The legislature can brace the litigation leg of the holistic statutory
approach by raising the cap on exemplary damages under the CPA from
$10,000 to $50,000. While many homeowners in today's market hold
equity exceeding $50,000, and an even higher cap would provide greater
protection, it would be pragmatic for the legislature to approach this
problem incrementally. An amendment that merely raises the cap to ac-
count for inflation should be easier to enact than one that doubles or tri-
ples the limit. Under the anachronistically low cap in place today, an
FRS victim who loses $15,000 in equity (a relatively small amount in
today's market) is barred from recovering any exemplary damages under
the CPA. That same victim would be more willing to vindicate his or her
rights if he or she could potentially recover $45,000 in exemplary dam-
ages. He or she would also benefit from a wider selection of experienced
attorneys willing to take on the likely complex and time-consuming case.
The filing of a lawsuit in which a larger award of exemplary damages is
sought would give the FRSA a strong incentive to quickly agree to a set-
tlement, thereby not only fairly compensating the victim but also lighten-
ing the court's docket. In addition, the increased liability for exemplary
damages would provide a greater deterrent to other FRSAs contemplat-
ing preying upon a Washington homeowner.
As stated above, the CPA can afford an FRS victim relief either
standing alone or by operating in conjunction with other statutes. 60 This
Comment next examines these other statutes, together with common law
and equitable remedies, that an aggrieved homeowner can utilize in at-
tempting to regain his or her home and/or equity.
b. Equity Skimming Act
The ESA was enacted for the purpose of forbidding "equity skim-
ming," but defines that practice so narrowly that it almost never applies
in the FRS context. 61 Moreover, the ESA was enacted to address the
problem of "persons. .. defrauding innocent homeowners of their equity
interest ... in residential dwellings under the guise of a purchase of the
owner's residence. 62
An FRSA commits an "act of equity skimming" under the ESA
only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) an investor purchases
a residential property from a homeowner; (2) the homeowner finances all
or part of the purchase price; (3) the homeowner's right to receive the
60. See infra Parts III.A.1.b-d, Parts III.B.I-2.
61. See WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34.020(4) (2006).
62. Id. § 61.34.010.
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balance of the purchase price is either not secured by a lien on the home
or is secured by a lien inferior to a mortgage taken out by the investor;
(4) the investor encumbers the property with a mortgage superior to any
lien of the homeowner to recover the balance of the purchase price; (5)
the investor uses proceeds from the mortgage for his or her own benefit
rather than for the property; and (6) the investor defaults on the mortgage
within two years.63
Although at first blush the ESA would appear to be directly appli-
cable in FRS cases, most FRS scenarios actually fall outside its narrow
64definition of equity skimming. The typical FRS does not qualify as an
"act of equity skimming" for two reasons. First, the transactions are
structured so that the homeowner does not finance any part of the pur-
chase price. Second, the FRSA keeps the new mortgage current until he
or she sells the property at fair market value, rather than defaulting on a
home equity loan and absconding with its proceeds.
65
The ESA provides for civil liability under the CPA if an FRSA hap-
pens to be sloppy enough to commit "an act of equity skimming" under
the statute's constricted definition. An "act of equity skimming" estab-
lishes the first three of the five elements needed to prove a CPA viola-
66tion. Moreover, the commission of at least three such acts within a
three-year period is defined by the statute as a "pattern of equity skim-
ming.''67  Any person who willfully engages in a "pattern of equity
skimming" is guilty of a class B felony,68 and every "act of equity skim-
ming" committed is considered a separate current offense for purposes of
determining the sentencing range.
69
While the ESA adequately provides for criminal and civil liability if
its provisions are triggered, it fails to sufficiently protect Washington
homeowners because its definition of equity skimming is unjustifiably
narrow. The legislature could vastly improve the statute's efficacy by
expanding this limited definition. The ESA was enacted to protect
homeowners from people intent on defrauding them of their equity under
the guise of a purchase of the homeowner's property.7 ° Its constricted
language, however, fails to protect homeowners from FRSAs. In the
63. See id. § 61.34.020(4).
64. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 37.
65. Id. at 39.
66. See WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34.040 (2006); supra Part III.A. l.a.
67. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34.020(l).
68. Id. § 61.34.030. A class B felony is punishable by a maximum often years in prison, a fine
of $20,000, or both. Id. § 9A.20.021(l)(b).
69. Id. § 61.34.030.
70.1d. § 61.34.010.
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typical Washington scam, the FRSA obtains new financing that allows
him to pay off the homeowner's loan in default; he or she subsequently
sells the property at fair market value and pockets the homeowner's eq-
uity.71 The mechanics of the scam put it outside the scope of the ESA,
which requires either that the purchaser assume the existing mortgage 2
or that the seller finance some or the entire purchase price.73
Simply by amending the ESA slightly, the legislature could signifi-
cantly bolster the enforcement and litigation legs of the holistic approach
to fighting foreclosure rescue abuses. Specifically, it could create a new
category within the definition of "act of equity skimming, 74 which
would broaden the ESA by bringing FRSAs within its scope. For exam-
ple, an effective addition to the definition might state that a person com-
mits an "act of equity skimming" if he or she: (1) purchases a dwelling
from a seller who has a mortgage or deed of trust in default; (2) enters
into a leaseback/repurchase transaction with the seller; (3) fails to
reconvey the property to the seller at the end of the term specified in the
transaction; and (4) commits a violation of the CPA 75 in the course of his
or her dealings with the seller. Such an amendment would supply
strength and relevance to a statute that has been rendered essentially use-
less by its overly narrow ambit.
c. Mortgage Broker Practices Act
The Washington legislature enacted the Mortgage Broker Practices
Act (MBPA) to promote honesty and fair dealing in that industry, as well
as to preserve public confidence in the lending and real estate commu-
nity.76 The statute is relevant in FRS litigation because some FRSAs are,
or present themselves to the public as, mortgage brokers.77 Any person
who makes, or assists in obtaining, residential mortgage loans (or holds
him- or herself out as being able to do so) for financial gain is a mort-
gage broker under the statute. 78 All mortgage brokers are required to be
71. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 39.
72. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34.020(4)(a)(i) (2006).
73. Id. § 61.34.020(4)(b)(i).
74. Id. § 61.34.020(4).
75. Id. § 19.86. The typical FRSA regularly violates the CPA by committing a multitude of
"unfair or deceptive" acts. For example, a FRSA might pressure the homeowner to enter the transac-
tion by delaying the closing until immediately before the foreclosure sale; the FRSA might then draft
transaction documents that are far less favorable than the oral description of the transaction. See id.
§ 19.86.020; Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 30-31.
76. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.005 (2006).
77. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 32.
78. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.010(12) (2006).
[Vol. 31:353
Foreclosure Rescue Scams in Washington
licensed.79 As described below, the MBPA specifically prohibits a num-
ber of practices commonly engaged in by FRSAs.
The statute's efficacy in the fight against FRSs, however, is ham-
pered by three factors. First, FRS victims must prove that their purported
conveyances were, in fact, residential mortgage loans.80 Second, the stat-
ute provides no protection if the FRSA is not a mortgage broker and does
not hold him- or herself out to the public as one. 81 Finally, an FRSA who
violates the MBPA can be convicted of only a misdemeanor.82
The MBPA prohibits a variety of conduct commonly engaged in by
FRSAs. For example, mortgage brokers may not employ any "scheme,
device, or artifice" to defraud someone; nor may they engage in any un-
fair or deceptive practices toward any person or obtain property by fraud
or misrepresentation. 83 Likewise, a broker who fails to comply with any
requirement of the Truth-in-Lending Act (TILA) 84 or the Real Estate Set-
tlement Procedures Act (RESPA)85 has also committed a violation of the
MBPA. 86 In addition, the MBPA requires mortgage brokers, within three
days of receiving an application or payment, to provide borrowers with a
complete itemization and explanation of all fees and costs associated
with the proposed loan, including a specification of all fees charged by
the brokers themselves.87 Moreover, under the MBPA, every contract
between a mortgage broker and a borrower must be in writing and must
contain the entire agreement.
88
An FRSA who violates the MPBA may not face stiff sanctions. An
MBPA violation is an "unfair or deceptive act or practice and unfair
method of competition in the conduct of trade or commerce" that "vitally
affect[s] the public interest"; it thus establishes the first three elements of
the CPA, and a remedy may be sought under that statute.89 A violation
of the MBPA, or any rule or order of the director of the Department of
79.Id. § 19.146.200.
80. See id. § 19.146.0201(7).
81. See id. § 19.146.010(12).
82. Id. § 19.146.110. Congress has recognized that the designation of fraudulent conduct as a
misdemeanor can fail to provide "adequate deterrents" against such behavior. H.R. REP. NO. 95-
393(11), at 53 (1977), as reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3039, 3055.
83. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.0201(1-3) (2006).
84. See infra Part I11.B. 1.
85. See infra Part I11.B.2.
86. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.0201(11) (2006).
87. Id. § 19.146.030(1).
88.Id. § 19.146.040.
89. Id. § 19.146.100; seesupra Part III.A.l.a.
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Financial Institutions (DFI), is a misdemeanor.90 Mortgage brokers (or
those presenting themselves to the public as such) who run afoul of the
MBPA may be fined or ordered to pay restitution by the director of the
DFI. 91 The DFI investigates alleged violations of the MBPA by FRSAs,
but takes a reactive approach to enforcement, acting only upon the re-
ceipt of a complaint.92
While the MBPA may be applicable in certain FRS cases, it is de-
signed for standard mortgage lending situations and is intended to protect
borrowers from commercial lenders.93  To invoke the statute, an FRS
victim must convince the court that the sale-leaseback transaction he or
she executed was, in substance, an attempt to obtain a residential mort-
gage loan.94 In addition, an FRS victim is not protected by the statute if
the FRSA is not a mortgage broker and does not hold him- or herself out
to the public as such.95 Moreover, because a violation of the MPBA con-
stitutes only a misdemeanor, 96 the strength of the statute is undermined
and rendered a less effective tool in the fight against foreclosure rescue
abuses.
d. Credit Services Organization Act
The Credit Services Organization Act (CSOA) regulates persons
who claim that they can stop, prevent, or delay the foreclosure of a mort-
gage in return for financial gain.97 A person offering such a service is
faced with several restrictions under the CSOA: He or she must (1) ob-
tain a $10,000 surety bond issued on the condition of compliance with
the CSOA; (2) refrain from charging for mere referrals to other credit-
repair retailers; (3) refrain from advising customers to make untrue or
misleading statements to a credit reporting agency or potential lender;
90. WASH. REV. CODE. § 19.146.110 (2006). A misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum of
ninety days imprisonment, a fine of $1000, or both. Id. § 9A.20.021(3).
91.Id. § 19.146.220(2).
92. See E-mail from Steven C. Sherman, Financial Legal Examiner, Department of Financial
Institutions, to the author (Feb. 7, 2007, 14:50 PST) (on file with author). In 2003, the Washington
Legislature enacted the Mortgage Lending Fraud Prosecution Account Act, which established, for a
term of three years, a one-dollar surcharge on the recording of each deed of trust, to be used by the
DFI to pursue criminal prosecution of fraudulent activities relating to mortgage lending. S.H.B.
1081, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 36.22.181 (2006)). The
legislature subsequently extended the surcharge until 2011. H.B. 2338, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2006).
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.146.005 (2006).
94. See id. § 19.146.0201(7).
95. See id. § 19.146.010(12).
96.Id. § 19.146.110.
97. Id. § 19.134.010(2)(a)(iii).
[Vol. 31:353
Foreclosure Rescue Scams in Washington
and (4) refrain from personally making untrue or misleading statements
or engaging in fraudulent or deceptive conduct in connection with his or
her business activities.98
Under this statute, an FRSA must provide a complete and detailed
description of the services to be performed, along with the total amount
that will be charged for those services. 99 He or she must also provide the
homeowner with a statement that explains the homeowner's right to pro-
ceed against the surety bond and gives the name and address of the com-
pany that issued it. 100 The CSOA requires that a written contract be
signed by the homeowner; the contract must contain essential terms of
the agreement and a conspicuous statement of the homeowner's five-day
right to cancel.' 0l Furthermore, an FRSA violates the CSOA if he or she
attempts to persuade the homeowner to waive any of the rights it pro-
vides. 102 In any event, a homeowner's attempted waiver of a CSOA right
is void.'03
FRSAs are likely to violate the CSOA in a number of ways. 04 For
example, the typical FRSA might do any of the following: fail to obtain
the required surety bond, make untrue or misleading statements to the
homeowner, engage in fraudulent or deceptive conduct, fail to make the
required disclosures, or disregard the five-day cancellation period. 0 5 A
violation of the CSOA can lead to criminal penalties and civil liability.'0 6
A violator is guilty of a gross misdemeanor, and district courts are given
equitable jurisdiction to restrain and enjoin ongoing violations. 0 7 In ad-
dition, a CSOA violation serves to establish the first of five elements
needed by an FRS victim to prevail on a CPA claim. 08 Persons injured
by violations of the CSOA may sue to recover actual and punitive dam-
ages, reasonable attorney's fees, and court costs. 10 9
On its face, the CSOA appears to be a fairly well-crafted statute.
Its provisions for both criminal and civil liability, as well as injunctive
relief, apparently make it a useful tool for those victimized by FRSAs.
98.Id. § 19.134.020.
99.3d. § 19.134.050(3).
100. ld. § 19.134.050(4)-(5).
101.Id. § 19.134.060.
102. Id. § 19.134.070(1).
103. Id.
104. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 36.
105. Id. at 36-37.
106. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.070-.080 (2006).
107. Id. § 19.134.070(3). A gross misdemeanor is punishable by a maximum of imprisonment
for one year, a fine of $5000, or both Id. § 9A.20.021(2).
108. See id. § 19.134.070(5); supra Part 11I.A.l.a.
109. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.134.080(1) (2006).
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Because there is a lack of case law interpreting and applying the CSOA,
however, the statute's true value to FRS victims has yet to be established.
In addition to statutory remedies, a victimized homeowner may also
seek to be made whole under a number of common law theories. This
Comment next explores, from the perspective of an FRS victim, the
strengths and weaknesses of these potential avenues of relief.
2. Common Law Remedies
a. Fraud
Virtually any FRS will contain elements of fraudulent conduct.
11 °
Three types of fraud are prevalent in these scams: intentional misrepre-
sentations, material omissions, and bad-faith promises.111 An FRSA
typically uses numerous forms of deception over the course of the scam
in order to gain the homeowner's trust and confidence and to prevent the
homeowner from pursuing logical methods of avoiding foreclosure, such
as refinancing or selling the property.
12
To establish a claim of intentional misrepresentation in Washing-
ton, a plaintiff must prove nine elements by "clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing evidence."' 13 Although an FRSA's conduct may fairly be character-
ized as fraudulent, an FRS victim bringing an intentional-
misrepresentation claim may often be vulnerable to a motion to dismiss,
due to the large number of elements that must be established and the
heavy evidentiary burden that must be carried.
The second type of fraud often seen in FRSs is characterized by the
material omission, i.e., the failure to reveal a material fact within one's
knowledge when one has a duty to speak.1 14 For example, a homeowner
in default might receive a solicitation from an FRSA claiming expertise
in saving homes from foreclosure. The homeowner might then ask the
FRSA what the homeowner can do to save the house. If the FRSA
suggests that the homeowner sell the property to the FRSA and then
110. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 13.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Guarino v. Interactive Objects, Inc., 122 Wash. App. 95, 126, 86 P.3d 1175, 1191 (2004)
(citing Williams v. Joslin, 65 Wash. 2d 696, 697, 399 P.2d 308, 308-09 (1965)). The elements of
intentional misrepresentation are (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its
falsity; (4) the speaker's knowledge of the truth; (5) the speaker's intent that the recipient will rely
upon the fact; (6) ignorance on the part of the recipient; (7) reliance on the part of the recipient; (8)
the recipient's right to rely; and (9) the recipient's resulting damage as a result of his or her reliance.
Id.
114. Favors v. Matzke, 53 Wash. App. 789, 796, 770 P.2d 686, 690 (1989).
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lease it back, but fails to disclose viable alternatives such as selling the
property at fair market value or refinancing, the FRSA likely has
breached a duty to disclose the material fact of the homeowner's alterna-
tives. "15
The third type of fraud relevant in FRS litigation is the bad-faith
promise, which occurs when a person makes a promise that he or she
does not, at that time, intend to keep.' 16 An FRSA, for example, might
promise a homeowner assistance in obtaining a loan in order to reacquire
the property at the end of the lease period, with full knowledge that the
homeowner will almost certainly lack the income necessary to acquire a
loan for the buyback amount." 
7
If a court determines that fraud has occurred, one remedy at its dis-
posal is the constructive trust. A court will impress a constructive trust
on property when it finds that the property was acquired under circum-
stances indicating that the holder of legal title has been unjustly enriched
at the expense of another interested party." 8 An FRS victim can use the
constructive trust doctrine to seek recovery of either the victim's home or
its equity. 119 He or she will be barred from recovering the property under
this doctrine, however, if the FRSA has subsequently conveyed the prop-
erty to a bona fide purchaser for value. 2 '
In sum, the pursuit of a fraud claim may not provide as much pro-
tection as might be thought at first glance, due to the many elements that
must often be established, the high evidentiary burden imposed, and the
inability to recover the home from a bona fide purchaser. Implementing
the holistic approach advocated for in this Comment, however, would
help fill the gaps inherent in this theory of recovery.
b. Breach of Contract/Promissory Estoppel
Occasionally, the terms of an FRS transaction are fair or even ad-
vantageous to the homeowner facing foreclosure; FRSAs in such cases
victimize the homeowner by failing to honor the agreed-to terms.' 2' For
115. See id.
116. In re Marriage of Lutz, 74 Wash. App. 356, 367-68, 873 P.2d 566, 572 (1994).
117. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 15.
118. Imagineering, Inc. v. Kiewit Pac. Co., 976 F.2d 1303, 1313 (9th Cir. 1992). An imposi-
tion of a constructive trust amounts to a holding that the wrongdoer is to be treated as if he had been
a trustee for the victim of the fraud from the time he acquired title. Huber v. Coast Inv. Co., 30
Wash. App. 804, 810, 638 P.2d 609, 612 (1981) (citing G. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471
(2d rev. ed. 1978)).
119. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 16.
120. See In re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d 1125, 1128 (9th Cir. 1990).
121. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 22.
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example, a homeowner might contract for an option to repurchase his or
her home for a reasonable price after leasing for a year, only to see the
FRSA double the price of the option when he or she tries to exercise it.
122
In this situation, the FRS victim can pursue a claim for breach of contract
or, if a contract was never formed, the quasi-contractual theory of prom-
issory estoppel.12 3 Possible remedies for breach of contract and promis-
sory estoppel include specific performance, compensatory damages, and
expectation damages. 
124
An FRS victim should consider pursuing a breach of contract claim
only in those rare cases where the terms of the contract favor him or her.
In addition, aggrieved homeowners will likely find it difficult to prevail
on a promissory estoppel claim because FRSAs are generally careful not
to leave a paper trail of their many false promises.
c. Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Homeowners facing foreclosure often place heightened trust in the
skill and expertise of an FRSA who is, or poses as, a real estate agent or
mortgage broker. 25 Under these circumstances, an FRSA can become a
fiduciary of the homeowner, which allows the homeowner to justifiably
relax his or her guard and repose trust in the FRSA. 126 When such a rela-
tionship is exploited by an FRSA, the victim may possess a viable tort
claim for breach of fiduciary duty. 1
27
In Washington, real estate brokers owe fiduciary duties to their cli-
ents as a matter of law, 28 as do mortgage brokers. 129 Therefore, if an
FRSA is neither a real estate broker nor a mortgage broker, an FRS vic-
tim will need to establish a fiduciary duty by implication. To establish
such an implied duty, victims must show two things. First, they must
122. Id. at 23.
123. Id. at 22-24.
124. Id. at 24.
125. See id. at 16.
126. See Liebergesell v. Evans, 93 Wash. 2d 881, 889-90, 613 P.2d 1170, 1175 (1980) (stating
that a fiduciary relationship can arise in fact between parties regardless of their relationship in law).
127. See id
128. Koller v. Belote, 12 Wash. App. 194, 195-96, 528 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (1974) (quoting
Mersky v. Multiple Listing Bureau of Olympia, Inc., 73 Wash. 2d 225, 437 P.2d 897 (1968)) (hold-
ing that real estate broker forfeited commission by failing to make a clear and express disclosure of
his dual agency).
129. See Rushing v. Stephanus, 64 Wash. 2d 607, 612, 393 P.2d 281, 284 (1964) (quoting
Mattieligh v. Poe, 57 Wash. 2d 203, 356 P.2d 328 (1960)) (holding that mortgage broker forfeited
commission and was liable for clients' expenses due to his breach of fiduciary duty). But see Brazier
v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1143 (W.D. Wash. 2003) (finding no factual basis
for an implied-in-law fiduciary duty between mortgage broker and client when contract specifically
provided that broker was not client's agent).
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demonstrate both that they placed their trust and confidence in an FRSA
and that there was a resulting superiority and influence on the FRSA's
part. 130 Second, they must demonstrate the existence of an agency rela-
tionship between themselves and the FRSA.'31
Because FRS victims have lost their homes and equity, it should not
be difficult for them to establish that they were injured by the breach of
fiduciary duty. To prevail under this theory, however, victims must also
establish that but for the breach, they would not have suffered the lOSS. 132
Homeowners have the burden of finding and proving specific fiduciary
breaches that directly caused them to make decisions or take actions that
led to the loss of their homes and equity. 133  FRS victims pursuing a
breach of fiduciary duty theory will likely find this causation element the




Under the equitable mortgage doctrine, a court has the equitable
power to declare that a deed purporting to convey title is in fact merely a
mortgage conveying a security interest to the grantee. 135 This doctrine is
critical in FRS litigation because an essential component of the scam in-
volves the homeowner conveying his or her property title to the FRSA or
a confederate. 136  FRS victims who prevail on an equitable mortgage
claim may be able to recover and keep their homes if they are able to
repay the amount that the FRSA spent to pay off the defaulted mortgage
130. See Hood v. Cline, 35 Wash. 2d 192, 205, 212 P.2d 110, 118 (1949) (quoting Wheeler v.
Yoakam, 136 Wash. 216, 219, 239 P. 557, 558 (1925)) (finding no fiduciary relationship between
parties to land transaction where one neither reposed any particular confidence in the other nor relied
upon any information he conveyed).
131. See Mullen v. N. Pac. Bank, 25 Wash. App. 864, 877, 610 P.2d 949, 957 (1980) (citing
Moss v. Vadman, 77 Wash. 2d 396, 404, 463 P.2d 159, 164 (1969)) (holding that lender had no
fiduciary duty to borrower to insure borrower's interest in vehicle that was collateral for loan). An
agency relationship results from the manifestation of consent by one person that another shall act on
his behalf and subject to his control, with a correlative manifestation of consent by the other party to
act on his behalf and subject to his control. Skagit State Bank v. Rasmussen, 109 Wash. 2d 377,
388, 745 P.2d 37,43 (1987) (quoting Moss v. Vadman, 77 Wash. 2d 396, 402-03, 463 P.2d 159, 164
(1969)).
132. See Miller v. U.S. Bank of Wash., N.A., 72 Wash. App. 416, 426, 865 P.2d 536, 543
(1994) (quoting Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wash. 2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d 483, 485 (1992)).
133. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 19-20.
134. See id. at 19.
135. See Plummer v. llse, 41 Wash. 5, 9, 82 P. 1009, 1011 (1905).
136. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 8.
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loan. 137 If they cannot repay the FRSA, they can at least sell their prop-
erty at fair market value, repay the FRSA, and recover their equity.'
38
On one hand, the evidence needed to prevail under an equitable mortgage
cause of action will ordinarily be accessible; on the other, FRS victims
must prove their cases under the daunting "clear, cogent, and convinc-
ing" evidentiary standard, 139 which can make it quite difficult for them to
succeed. 140
b. Unconscionability
Because the facts and circumstances of a typical FRS affront the
sense of decency, a scam victim will often be able to assert a viable
claim for relief on the ground that the transactions he or she entered into
were unconscionable. 141 Parties to a contract are generally bound by its
terms, but a court that finds a term unconscionable may either sever that
term from the contract, leaving the contract otherwise intact, or declare
the entire agreement void and unenforceable.1 42 In Washington, a con-
tract, or a term therein, may be invalid based on either procedural or sub-
stantive unconscionability1
43
A court will find procedural unconscionability in the formation of a
contract if a party lacked meaningful choice when entering into it.14 4 An
aggrieved homeowner might effectively demonstrate a lack of meaning-
ful choice by establishing that he or she lacked sufficient knowledge to
exercise other alternatives, such as refinancing or selling the property at
fair market value; the homeowner could also show that actions by the
FRSA rendered other alternatives infeasible. 145 To make the first show-
ing, an FRS victim might demonstrate a lack of sufficient knowledge by
introducing evidence of a lack of financial sophistication, cognitive
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id.
139. See Pearson v. Gray, 90 Wash. App. 911, 916, 954 P.2d 343, 346 (1998).
140. Proving the existence of an equitable mortgage under this evidentiary standard is more
difficult than it would be under the typical civil "preponderance" standard but easier than it would be
under the criminal "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard. See Bland v. Mentor, 63 Wash. 2d 150,
154, 385 P.2d 727, 730 (1963). In establishing the creation of an equitable mortgage, the FRS vic-
tim's burden of proof may approach that of the criminal prosecutor's. See 5 KARL B. TEGLAND,
WASHINGTON PRACTICE: EVIDENCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 301.3 (5th ed. 2007) (stating that the
"clear, cogent, and convincing" standard requires something less than proof "beyond a reasonable
doubt").
141. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 11.
142. See Zuver v. Airtouch Commc'ns, Inc., 153 Wash. 2d 293, 320, 103 P.3d 753, 768 (2004).
143. See Al-Safin v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 394 F.3d 1254, 1259 (9th Cir. 2005).
144. Adler v. Fred Lind Manor, 153 Wash. 2d 331, 348-49, 103 P.3d 773, 783 (2004).
145. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 12.
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disabilities, limited English proficiency, illiteracy, or similar traits. 46 To
make the second showing, an FRS victim could prove that the FRSA
took steps to ensure that other alternatives were infeasible, including (1)
delaying the FRS transaction until immediately before the foreclosure
sale, so that it was too late to exercise other options; (2) amending the
transactions terms at the last minute; (3) clouding the property's title
with documents such as purchase-and-sale agreements in order to ob-
struct a sale to anyone other than the FRSA; or (4) initiating improve-
ments to the property, so as to obstruct refinancing or sale to another
party.
147
FRS transactions often raise issues of substantive unconscionability
as well. A court finds substantive unconscionability if a term or clause
of a contract is excessively one-sided. 48 In making this determination,
the court evaluates whether the term is "shocking to the conscience,"
"monstrously harsh," or "exceedingly calloused."' 149 Many transactions
executed in the course of an FRS will exhibit some of these one-sided
aspects of substantive unconscionability, because these scams ultimately
result in the homeowner losing most or all of his or her equity and the
FRSA reaping a windfall. 50 In claims of substantive unconscionability,
the party attacking a contract or term thereof bears the burden of proof.'5'
The aggrieved homeowner might do this successfully by contrasting the
typical home sale with the FRS transaction he or she actually entered
into. Demonstrating this contrast will often be straightforward for the
homeowner. A typical home sale results in the seller retaining accumu-
lated equity, less reasonable fees and commissions. An FRS, on the
other hand, leads to the homeowner keeping little or none of his or her
equity.
152
Despite the potential relief afforded by the doctrine of unconscion-
ability, the most glaring danger for an FRS victim pursuing this type of
claim is that he or she will simply not be able to persuade a court that
there was unconscionability in the formation or substance of the instru-
ments executed. In spite of the inequitable facts in the record, many
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Adler, 153 Wash. 2d at 344, 103 P.3d at 781 (quoting Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc.,
86 Wash. 2d 256, 260, 544 P.2d 20, 23 (1975)).
149. See id. at 344-45, 103 P.3d at 781 (quoting Nelson v. McGoldrick, 127 Wash. 2d 124,
131,896 P.2d 1258, 1262 (1995)).
150. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 12.
151. Tjart v. Smith Barney, Inc., 107 Wash. App. 885, 898, 28 P.3d 823, 830 (2001) (citing
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 262-63, 544 P.2d 20, 25 (1975)).
152. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 12.
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courts will have little sympathy for homeowners who sign contracts and
then subsequently claim to have not read or understood them before sign-
ing. 15 3 The education leg of this Comment's holistic approach is impli-
cated here. Informing financially distressed homeowners about the exis-
tence and danger of the FRS, as early as possible, can help eliminate the
possibility that they will later need to rely on an unsympathetic judge in
order to regain their stolen equity.
In addition to state remedies, an FRS victim may choose to pursue
remedies created by federal statute. The next Section surveys these po-
tential avenues of relief.
B. Federal Remedies
While both the statutes and common law of Washington offer pos-
sible remedies for FRS victims, limited federal relief may also be avail-
able. Federal consumer protection statutes have been applied in FRS
litigation. 154 Unfortunately, none of these federal forms of relief squarely
addresses the needs of FRS victims. This section will briefly discuss
TILA, 55 RESPA, 15 6 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act (RICO). 1
57
1. Truth-in-Lending Act
Congress enacted TILA so that potential borrowers could more eas-
ily compare the loan terms offered by potential lenders. 158 TILA requires
that lenders disclose certain material terms on a model disclosure form
prescribed by the Federal Reserve Board. 159 By requiring standardized
disclosure of these material terms, Congress reasoned, potential borrow-
ers will find it easier to compare the terms offered by various sources,
thus enabling them to choose the best deal available.
160
Not all FRSs fall under TILA, but it does offer significant advan-
tages to FRS victims who can establish that their sale-leaseback
153. See Larry A. DiMatteo & Bruce Louis Rich, A Consent Theory of Unconscionability: An
Empirical Study of Law in Action, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1067, 1092-1100 (2006) (analyzing 148
federal cases from 1968 to 2003 involving unconscionability and finding that the contract was held
to be unconscionable in only 37.8% of the cases).
154. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 40-49. FRS victims litigating in state court should
keep in mind that bringing claims under these statutes could result in the removal of the action to
federal court under federal question jurisdiction. Id. at 40.
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(2006).
156. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
157. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
158. See 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006).
159. Id. § 1604(b).
160. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 43.
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transaction was, in substance, a loan from the FRSA to the victim. 16' If
the plaintiff homeowner can both establish this and prove that he or she
did not receive accurate material disclosures, then he or she has standing
to bring a TILA complaint and may recover actual and statutory dam-
ages, attorney's fees, costs, and injunctive relief.162 Most importantly,
the homeowner may also rescind the transaction. 16  In addition, a home-
owner who proves a TILA violation need not establish a causal relation
between the violation and his or her damages in order to obtain relief.
164
TILA violations can also trigger certain state law provisions. For
example, a proven TILA violation not only constitutes a violation of the
state MBPA but also establishes the first three elements needed to prevail
on a state CPA claim. 165 Moreover, prevailing on a TILA claim can be
relatively straightforward for a victim.166  Indeed, victims can usually
prove a violation by merely introducing into evidence the transaction
documents they signed with the perpetrators of the scam.'
67
To pursue a TILA claim, however, an FRS victim must hurdle three
significant obstacles. First, for the statute to apply, the victim must con-
vince the court that the sale-leaseback transaction was actually a loan in
substance. 168 Second, the FRS victim must demonstrate that the FRSA
meets TILA's narrow definition of "creditor," i.e., a lender who "regu-
larly extends" credit. 69 Finally, some FRS victims will be unable to re-
cover their homes under the TILA rescission remedy because that rem-
edy usually expires when the FRSA resells the property. 70 Thus, under
TILA, an FRS victim whose home has been sold to a bona fide purchaser
may be limited to seeking damages, fees, and costs.
171
161. See In re Hanley, 111 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. C.D. Il1. 1990) (whether a purported rental
agreement-purchase option is a credit agreement for TILA purposes is a question of fact).
162. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (2006).
163. Id. § 1635.
164. See, e.g., Huff v. Stewart-Gwinn Furniture Co., 713 F.2d 67, 69 (4th Cir. 1983) (minor
violations of TILA impose liability even if consumer was not misled).
165. Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003); see
supra Parts III.A. La, III.A.I.c.
166. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 48.
167. Id.
168. See In re Hanley, 111 B.R. 709, 713 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1990).
169. See Eby v. Reb Realty, Inc., 495 F.2d 646, 649-50 (9th Cir. 1974). For example, under
TILA, a person who has extended credit more than 25 times in the current or preceding calendar
year, or one who has extended credit secured by a dwelling more than five times in the current or
preceding calendar year is considered a lender who "regularly extends" credit. 12 C.F.R. §
226.2(a)(17) (2006).
170. See 15 U.S.C. § 1635(f) (2006).
171. See id. § 1640.
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In sum, TILA can play an important role in FRS litigation, but its
usefulness is hampered by the hurdles and limitations described above.
Rather than forcing FRS victims to rely on this frayed federal safety net,
the Washington legislature could better protect its constituents by
strengthening the three legs of the holistic statutory approach proposed in
this Comment.
2. Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
RESPA governs certain aspects of residential real estate closings.
172
Two aspects of RESPA are important in FRS cases. First, it applies in
almost all residential real estate transactions involving mortgage loans
and requires the closing agent to prepare a "HUD-1 Settlement State-
ment" (HUD-1) and distribute it to the borrower, seller, and lender at or
before the closing.1 73 Second, RESPA prohibits giving or receiving un-
earned fees or kickbacks relating to a closing involving a federally regu-
lated mortgage loan.
1 74
The HUD-1 is a standard form developed by the United States De-
partment of Housing and Urban and Development (HUD). 175 The agent
conducting the closing must use the form to clearly itemize all charges
imposed on both the borrower and the seller if a federally related mort-
gage loan is involved. 176 Because the HUD-1 mandates disclosure of
material information about a transaction, such as the sale price of the
property, the funding source, the parties paid, and fees and charges, not
only is this form key to understanding the details of an FRS, but it is also
a critical piece of evidence in litigation. 177 Unfortunately for an FRS vic-
tim, RESPA's HUD-1 requirement is enforceable only through HUD
administrative action.
1 78
The RESPA prohibition of unearned fees and kickbacks enables a
scam victim to challenge the various fees and charges that FRSAs com-
monly pile on transactions in order to maximize their equity theft. 179 For
example, an FRS victim might successfully challenge an escrow agent's
charge for an "account processing fee." A court may find this charge to
172. 12 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
173. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.8(a) (2006). FRSAs often rely on mortgage loans to finance their
acquisition of properties, which subjects them to RESPA requirements. See Fredrickson & Dunn,
supra note 25, at 39.
174. 12 U.S.C. § 2607 (2006).
175. Id. § 2603(a).
176. Id.
177. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 41.
178. Id. at 42.
179. Id. at 41.
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be an unearned fee for RESPA purposes if the fee is duplicative or corre-
lates to a nonexistent or nominal service on the part of the escrow
agent. 80 Like a HI)UD-1 violation, a violation of this provision triggers
administrative enforcement; in addition, however, this type of transgres-
sion also creates a private right of action. 18' Under RESPA, an FRS vic-
tim charged an unlawful fee in a closing may recover three times the
amount charged through a civil action, as well as court costs and attor-
ney's fees. 182 Moreover, a RESPA violation both constitutes a per se
violation of the state MBPA and establishes the first three elements
needed to prevail on a state CPA claim. 83 While undoubtedly useful to
an FRS victim for recouping bogus closing costs, RESPA's efficacy as a
bar to equity theft is marginal.
3. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
The final federal statute discussed here that may possibly be of use
to FRS victims is RICO. The statute is applicable in the FRS context due
to its prohibition against collecting "unlawful debts.' 84  The statute's
definition of an "unlawful debt" encompasses any loan with an interest
rate at least twice that of the maximum allowed under a state's usury
law. 185 In cases involving most legitimate residential mortgage loans
issued by lenders regulated by federal agencies, federal regulations pre-
empt state usury laws, thus allowing higher interest rates than would oth-
erwise be permitted.' 86 Because FRSAs are not federally regulated lend-
ers, however, they are subject to state usury laws. 187 As a result, FRSAs
frequently violate RICO by lending money, under the guise of a convey-
ance, to homeowners at an interest rate exceeding twice that allowed un-
der Washington law.'
88
RICO provides several forms of relief for an FRS victim. For ex-
ample, anyone who is injured "in his person or property" by a RICO vio-
lation may seek a remedy of treble damages, costs, and attorney's fees in
federal court. 189 Additionally, district courts possess authority to order
180. See 24 C.F.R. § 3500.14(c) (2006).
181. 12 U.S.C. § 2607(d)(2) (2006).
182. Id. § 2607(d)(2).
183. Brazier v. Sec. Pac. Mortgage, Inc., 245 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1142 (W.D. Wash. 2003); see
supra Part Ill.A.l.a; III.A.1.c.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (2006).
185. Id. § 1961(6). At present, the maximum interest rate under Washington's usury law is
approximately twelve percent. See WASH. REV. CODE § 19.52.020 (2006).
186. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1735f, 3801-3806 (2006).
187. See Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 49.
188. Id.
189. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (2006).
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injunctive relief under the statute. 190 Finally, RICO also has conspiracy
provisions that may come into play in the FRS context; they assist in at-
taching liability to the multiple actors, both individual and corporate,
commonly involved in these swindles.' 9'
Unfortunately, there are two limitations under RICO that may put
an FRS victim at a significant disadvantage in court. First, the victim
will need to establish that the apparent conveyance of the property to the
FRSA was, in fact, a loan subject to Washington's usury law. 192 Second,
a victim whose strategic interests would best be served by litigating in
state court must nevertheless file a RICO claim in federal court. 93 While
RICO is a valuable tool in the FRS victim's arsenal, it plainly will not
stem the tide of foreclosure rescue abuses on its own.
TILA, 194 RESPA,' 95 and RICO 196 are the federal statutes most likely
to be invoked by FRS victims attempting to recover their stolen homes
and equity. Aggrieved homeowners may, of course, concurrently pursue
the state remedies previously discussed. 197
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
As discussed previously in Part III, FRS victims have a variety of
potential remedies available to them. For example, an aggrieved home-
owner could pursue a state statutory remedy under the CPA, a federal
statutory remedy created by TILA, a remedy under a common law theory
such as breach of fiduciary duty, or an equitable remedy based upon the
doctrine of unconscionability. In an appropriate case, the homeowner
might pursue all four claims.
Existing remedies, however, are each inadequate to some extent, as
evidenced by the growing prevalence of FRSs. This Comment recom-
mends the adoption of a holistic approach to combating this type of in-
sidious scheme, one that emphasizes each of the three crucial legs of this
strategy: education, enforcement, and litigation. The Washington legis-
lature can implement this approach, thus greatly strengthening the pro-
tections afforded vulnerable homeowners, simply by making minor
amendments to existing statutes. Specifically, the legislature should
190. Id. § 1964(a).
191. Fredrickson & Dunn, supra note 25, at 49.
192. Similar "substance-over-form" arguments are of use to FRS victims pursuing equitable
mortgage or TILA claims. See supra Parts III.A.3.a, II.B.1.
193. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (2006).
194. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(2006).
195. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (2006).
196. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006).
197. See supra Part 1II.A.
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amend the ESA, 198 the Deeds of Trust Act, 199 the Mortgage Lending
Fraud Prosecution Account Act,
200 and the CPA.201
A. Make the Equity Skimming Act
Applicable to Foreclosure Rescue Scams
As explained above, the ESA fails to protect homeowners from
FRSAs because it is too narrowly drawn.20 2 Thus, the typical Washing-
ton FRS falls outside of the scope of the ESA. The legislature, however,
can easily strengthen the enforcement and litigation legs of a holistic ap-
proach to fighting these scams by slightly amending the ESA. The
amendment should create a new category within the definition of "act of
equity skimming' 20 3 that describes the operation of an actual FRS. An
effective addition to the definition might state that a person commits an
"act of equity skimming" if he or she: (1) purchases a dwelling from a
seller who has a mortgage or deed of trust in default; (2) enters into a
leaseback/repurchase transaction with the seller; (3) fails to reconvey the
property to the seller at the end of the term specified in the transaction;
and (4) commits a violation of the CPA at some point in the course of his
or her dealings with the seller.
In its battle against FRSAs, the State of Washington would be well
served by a broader ESA that actually accomplishes what it currently
only purports to do. The legislature enacted the ESA in order to put a
stop to equity skimming; 20 4 without a broadening of its scope, this intent
will be thwarted and the statute will remain a dead letter.
B. Amend the Deeds of Trust Act to Require Lenders to
Send Defaulting Homeowners Notice Describing Foreclosure
Rescue Scams and Listing Counseling Opportunities
While this Comment has discussed a variety of post-FRS remedies,
many of these scams could be prevented outright if homeowners facing
foreclosure were warned of the danger FRSAs pose and were apprised of
the various alternatives available to persons in their situation. A poten-
tial victim needs early notice of the existence and prevalence of this type
198. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34 (2006).
199. Id. § 61.24.
200. Id. § 36.22.18.
201.Id. § 19.86.
202. See supra Part l1l.A.l.b.
203. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.34.020(4) (2006).
204. Id. § 61.34 (finding "this form of real estate fraud and abuse" to be "contrary to the public
policy of this state").
2008]
Seattle University Law Review
of scam before the first seemingly friendly face appears at his or her
door. Homeowners who have had notices of default filed against them
are often bombarded with FRS offers; FRSAs would find far fewer
homeowners willing to deal with them if homeowners in default were
informed of the availability of low-cost financial counseling services. 0 5
Giving consumers the information they need to protect themselves
at the time of default supports the education leg of the holistic statutory
approach advocated in this Comment. Potential FRS victims need timely
information that helps them understand that it is almost always better to
sell or refinance their home at the outset of the foreclosure process than
to attempt rescue measures, such as the FRS, that inevitably lead to a
total loss of equity.
20 6
To best effectuate this educational goal, the legislature should
amend the Deeds of Trust Act 2°7 to assure that homeowners in default are
warned of the existence of foreclosure rescue abuses and notified of the
availability of low-cost homeownership counseling. 0 8 The statute does
not currently require the lender, at the time of default, to take affirmative
steps that would help prevent FRSs. Instead, it requires only that a trus-
tee foreclosing a deed of trust transmit a copy of the notice of trustee's
sale and the notice of foreclosure to the homeowner. 0 9 In addition to
these two notices, the statute should require that the beneficiary also in-
clude a conspicuous notice (perhaps printed on brightly colored paper)
both warning of and describing the FRS and including a listing of free or
low-cost homeowner counseling services. 10
Of course, some potential FRS victims would undoubtedly over-
look such a notice, due not only to the stress inherent in their situation
but also to the oppressive volume of rescue offers such homeowners
commonly receive in the mail once a notice of default is filed. Many
others, however, are likely to be helped by such a notice-an educated
potential victim is a non-victim. Moreover, the cost to mortgage lenders
and other beneficiaries of deeds of trust would be minimal: merely the
205. See NORMA PAZ GARCIA, CONSUMERS UNION, DIRTY DEEDS: ABUSES AND FRAUDULENT
PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA'S HOME EQUITY MARKET pt. 4 (1995) available at
http://www.consumersunion.org/pub/core newmoney/001968.html.
206. See id
207. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24 (2006).
208. See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 50.
209. WASH. REV. CODE § 61.24.040 (2006).
210. See TRIPOLI & RENUART, supra note 2, at 50. Free or low-cost counseling on the topic of
foreclosure avoidance currently exists. See, e.g., Solid Ground Housing Counseling,
http://www.solid-ground.org/Programs/Housing/Counseling/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 12,
2007).
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price of one or two sheets of paper. While the costs of this proposal are
negligible, the potential benefits are staggering. Washington homeown-
ers can no longer afford to be ignorant of the growing threat the FRS
poses to their equity.
C. Amend the Mortgage Lending Fraud Prosecution Account Act to
Raise the Mortgage Recording Fee Surcharge that Funds Foreclosure
Rescue Scam Investigations by the Department of Financial Institutions
In 2003, the Washington legislature enacted the Mortgage Lending
Fraud Prosecution Account Act, which established, for a term of three
years, a one-dollar surcharge on the recording of each deed of trust, to be
used by the DFI to pursue criminal prosecution of fraudulent activities
within the mortgage lending process.21" ' In 2006, the legislature extended
the surcharge until 2011.212 The surcharge allows the DFI, which en-
forces the MBPA, to hire its own prosecutors, rather than having to per-
suade overworked local prosecutors to take on its cases.21 3 As of mid-
2006, the DFI had hired three enforcement attorneys and two criminal
attorneys and was prosecuting six FRS cases using surcharge funds.2 1 4
The legislature can strengthen the enforcement leg of the holistic
statutory approach recommended in this Comment by boosting the DFI's
enforcement capabilities against FRSAs through an increase in the statu-
tory recording surcharge. A fivefold increase, for example, would result
in a nominal recording fee of only five dollars, but would allow the DFI
to substantially expand its roster of prosecutors. Currently, the DFI in-
vestigates violations of the MBPA by FRSAs only upon receiving a com-
plaint.21 5 An influx of funding from a surcharge increase would em-
power the DFI to investigate FRSAs in a more aggressive and proactive
fashion. Ramping up enforcement via this simple and painless method
would significantly enhance the State's ability to protect the most vul-
nerable segment of its homeowning population.
211. S.H.B. 1081, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
§ 36.22.181 (2006)).
212. H.B. 2338, 59th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2006).
213. Editorial, Preventing Mortgage Fraud, 30 NAT'L MORTGAGE NEWS 44 (2006).
214. Id
215. See E-mail from Steven C. Sherman, Financial Legal Examiner, Department of Financial
Institutions, to the author (Feb. 7, 2007, 14:50 PST) (on file with author).
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D. Raise the Consumer Protection Act's
Cap on Exemplary Damages
As previously mentioned, the CPA's cap on exemplary damages
has not budged since 1971 and is in dire need of an upward revision.
216
The CPA authorizes exemplary damages in order to give citizens an in-
centive to act as private attorney generals . 17 Because the Office of the
Attorney General lacks the resources to fully enforce the CPA, private
suits benefit the public by supplementing public enforcement.218 A low
cap on exemplary damages discourages citizens from bringing suit
against violators and thus weakens the deterrent effect of the statute.2 19
The legislature should strengthen the litigation leg of the holistic
approach to fighting FRSAs by raising the CPA's cap on exemplary
damages from $10,000 to $50,000. An increased limit on this type of
liability would have several benefits. First, a raised cap would increase
the number of attorneys willing to represent FRS victims. Second, it
would encourage victims to fight back against those who would rob them
of their homes and their equity. Third, an increased limit on exemplary
damages would increase judicial efficiency by promoting settlements
between FRSAs and their victims. Fourth, a higher cap would encourage
more private suits against CPA violators, which would, in turn, lighten
the Attorneys General enforcement burden. Finally, greater liability in
this area would deter both actual and potential FRSAs from committing
future scams. A hike of the CPA's cap on exemplary damages is long
overdue. By implementing an increase from $10,000 to $50,000, which
merely tracks inflation, the legislature can significantly strengthen the
enforcement and litigation legs of the holistic statutory approach to pre-
venting equity theft.
V. CONCLUSION
Amy Jones's plight, as previously recounted, demonstrated how
easily an FRSA can turn a bad situation into a disastrous one. 220 Home-
owners in Amy's situation desperately want to believe that the FRSA
will allow them to start over and wipe the slate clean. As illustrated by
Amy's typical experience, however, the duped homeowner inevitably
conveys the property for a pittance and is then abruptly removed from
216. See supra Part III.A. La.
217. S. 60-5815, 1st Reg. Sess., at 2 (Wash. 2007).
218. Id.
219. See id.
220. See supra Part I .B.
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the home he or she once owned. The FRSA sells the home for fair mar-
ket value, pockets its equity, and moves on to seek his or her next victim.
If this Comment's recommendations had been in place when Amy
ran into financial difficulties, her story would likely not have been so
tragic. If her lender had been required to send her a notice that described
the danger of FRSs and contained information on homeownership coun-
seling, Amy would have been aware of her viable options, such as selling
her home at fair market value or refinancing. She probably would have
recognized Coburn and Rogers's pitch as an FRS, thus allowing her to
dismiss their duplicitous offer out of hand. Because the increase in the
recording surcharge would have bolstered the DFI's enforcement of the
MBPA, Coburn and Rogers's operation might even have been shut down
before they had the opportunity to approach Amy.
Even if she ignored the notice and fell victim to the scam, Amy's
alternatives for pursuing the return of her equity would have been
strengthened under the approach this Comment recommends. The
amended ESA would have properly treated Coburn and Rogers's conduct
as an "act of equity skimming," which would have greatly eased Amy's
pursuit of a CPA claim; the ESA violation would have established three
of the five elements needed to recover under that statute. Prevailing un-
der the CPA would have entitled Amy to actual damages, court costs,
attorney's fees, and exemplary damages of up to $50,000. In addition, if
it could be shown that Coburn and Rogers had committed two other "acts
of equity skimming" within a three-year period, they each would have
faced ten years in prison and a $20,000 fine.
As the number of Washingtonians facing foreclosure increases, 22 1
one may expect a concomitant increase in the volume of FRSs targeting
this vulnerable segment of our population. Any attempt to stem this ris-
ing tide of fraud and deception must rest on three legs: education, en-
forcement, and litigation. Homeowners in default must be made aware
of their options, any of which are doubtless preferable to transacting with
an FRSA. Enforcement of existing laws proscribing the conduct inherent
in the typical scam must be ramped up in order to keep pace with the ris-
ing foreclosure rate. Homeowners unlucky enough to fall victim to a
FRS must have access to tenacious attorneys who are able and willing to
recover the homes and equity stolen from their clients.
A home is often the most valuable asset a person will ever own. By
fine-tuning the laws implicated in foreclosure rescue abuses, the
221. Aubrey Cohen, Walls Closing in on Homeowners, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar.
17, 2007, at Al.
20081
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Washington legislature can and should enhance the protection extended
to such a vital part of its constituents' lives.
